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TERRY AND FOURTH AMENDMENT FIRST
PRINCIPLES
AKHIL REED AMAR*

The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers,and effects, against unreasonablesearches
and seizures, shall not be violated ....
INTRODUCTION: A TALE OF TWO TERRYS
Thirty years after the Supreme Court's landmark decision in
Terry v. Ohio' and almost seven-times-thirty years after the
adoption of the Fourth Amendment, many lawyers, scholars, and
judges still fail to grasp the basic insights of the case and the
first principles of the Amendment. Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Court in Terry must bear some of the blame for the
current confusion. Even as the great Chief of the great Court
pointed forward to a more sensible understanding of the
Amendment, he gestured backward to contradictory language
from earlier cases. Such is the unsteady path of common law
evolution, of course, but three decades of confusion are enough.
To the extent that there were in effect two inconsistent Terry
opinions, we must choose which Terry to follow. I urge that we
follow what I shall call the good Terry, not simply because it was
more sensible and more truly progressive, but also because that
opinion within the opinion was more consistent with constitutional text, history, and structure. Moreover, in the three decades since the case was decided, much of the Court's case law
has built on the foundation of the good Terry. Thus, three decades after Terry and two centuries after the Fourth Amendment,
we can, if we are wise, affirm insights that are not only forwardlooking in the best sense (workable and progressive) but also
backward-looking in an attractive sense (faithful to original intent and consistent with a good deal of precedent). In short,
Terry can help us grasp Fourth Amendment first principles, and
1
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these principles, in turn, can help us grasp Terry, and aid us in
deciding which Terry to follow today.
In a nutshell, the good Terry that I mean to affirm today had
several basic features. First, it embraced a broad definition of
"searches" and "seizures," enabling the Fourth Amendment to
apply to myriad ways in which government might intrude upon
citizens' persons, houses, papers, and effects. Second, the good
Terry did not insist that all such broadly defined searches and
seizures be preceded by warrants. Third, and more dramatic
still, the good Terry did not insist that all warrantless intrusions
be justified by probable cause. The stunning logical lesson of the
good Terry is thus that a warrantless search or seizure may
sometimes lawfully occur in a situation where a warrant could
not issue (because probable cause is lacking). Fourth, in place of
the misguided notions that every search or seizure always requires a warrant, and always requires probable cause, the good
Terry insisted that the Fourth Amendment means what it says
and says what it means: All searches and seizures must be reasonable. Reasonableness-not the warrant, not probable causethus emerged as the central Fourth Amendment mandate and
touchstone. Fifth, the good Terry identified some of the basic
components of Fourth Amendment reasonableness so that the
concept would make common sense and constitutional sense.
Reasonable intrusions must be proportionateto legitimate governmental purposes-more intrusive government action requires
more justification. Reasonableness must focus not only on privacy and secrecy but also on bodily integrity and personal dignity: Cops act unreasonably not just when they paw through my
pockets without good reason, but also when they beat me up for
fun or toy with me for sport. Reasonableness also implicates
race-a complete Fourth Amendment analysis, the good Terry
insisted, must be sensitive to the possibility of racial oppression
and harassment. If we wrongly think that the basic Fourth
Amendment mandates are warrants and probable cause, we will
have difficulty explicitly factoring race into the equation, but the
spacious concept of reasonableness allows us to look race square
Concerns about discrimination
in the eye, constitutionally.
should also remind us of the desirability, where possible, of
cabining the discretion of cops and other government officials.
This desideratum must thus factor into a proper analysis of constitutional reasonableness, the good Terry suggested. Reason-
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ableness analysis should also be suitably responsive to popular
sentiment. The views of ordinary citizens-especially citizens
specially intruded upon-are highly relevant to the reasonableness balance (though not always dispositive). Finally, on the issue of Fourth Amendment remedies, the good Terry candidly
conceded some of the problems of the exclusionary rule-the
costs it imposes on victims of crime, the frustration of efforts to
prevent crime, the analytic misfit of the rule when cops seek
goals other than convictions, the irrelevance of the rule when the
innocent are abused and no evidence is found, and the futility of
the rule in dealing with the problem of police brutality. In response, the good Terry cautioned against "a rigid and unthinking
application of the.., rule"2 and called for the development and
use of "other remedies than the exclusionary rule to curtail
abuses for which that sanction may prove inappropriate."3
The bad Terry that I mean to disavow today tended to undercut all this. It failed to define "search" and "seizure" broadly
enough: Sustained and purposeful surveillance by the unaided
eye, the bad Terry implied, is not a Fourth Amendment "search"
and thus, apparently, need not be reasonable. The bad Terry refused to retreat from earlier cases suggesting that warrants are
required "whenever practicable" and that in most situations only
"exigent circumstances" will excuse the lack of a warrant. The
bad Terry offered no explanation-none whatsoever-why cops
may sometimes search and seize without a warrant even in a
situation where no probable cause exists and thus no warrant
could lawfully be issued by a magistrate. (The answer to this
puzzle-that the Framers thought that searches without warrants were sometimes less dangerous than searches with warrants-is one that would no doubt be news to the bad Terry. Of
course this answer also undercuts the bad Terry's idea that only
"exigent" circumstances can excuse a lack of a warrant: Temporal exigency can explain why cops need not get a warrant where
there simply is not time to get one, but cannot explain why cops
can search without probable cause, where even a judge with all
the time in the world would be obliged to deny a warrant.) The
bad Terry hinted at some of the factors that bear on reasonableness, but failed to develop a systematic account of these factors,
needlessly leading civil libertarians to worry that under a proper
2

Id. at 15.

3Id.
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reasonableness regime, government would have free rein. And
to the extent the bad Terry could be read to imply that under a
proper reasonableness analysis, searching in the absence of individualized suspicion is always unconstitutional-that there
must always be "specific" facts pointing to specific targets-the
bad Terry offered civil libertarians false hope, and made a
promise that the Court cannot keep if it means to be faithful to
text, history, and common sense. Finally, the bad Terry, while
acknowledging the flaws of the exclusionary rule, nevertheless
pledged allegiance to it, and recycled silly arguments that the
rule is somehow mandated by the Constitution and by sound legal principles.

I. WHAT SHOULD COUNT AS "SEARCHES AND SEIZURES"?
The Terry Court began its substantive analysis, in section I
of its opinion, by quoting the language of the Fourth Amendment
as follows: "[Tihe right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated. ..."' Later, I shall focus on
the remarkable ellipses in Terry's quotation, which omitted altogether the remaining Fourth Amendment language concerning
warrants and probable cause. But for now, I want to direct our
attention to a more mundane point: The Fourth Amendment
comes into play only when "searches" or "seizures" take place.
How broadly should these threshold terms be read?
The good Terry suggested that these terms should be generously construed. In response to the argument that Officer
McFadden's frisking of Mr. Terry's outer garments fell short of a
full-blown arrest, and thus lay "outside the purview of the
Fourth Amendment,"5 the good Terry was rightly indignant:
We emphatically reject this notion. It is quite plain that
the Fourth Amendment governs "seizures" of the person
which do not eventuate in a trip to the station house and
prosecution for crime---"arrests" in traditional terminology. It must be recognized that whenever a police officer
accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk
away, he has "seized" that person. And it is nothing less
than sheer torture of the English language to suggest that
a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's
Id. at 8 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
'Id. at 16.
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clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find
weapons is not a "search." Moreover, it is simply fantastic to urge that such a procedure performed in public by a
policeman while the citizen stands helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his hands raised, is a "petty indignity." It
is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person,
which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly.'
Why, we might ask, did anyone ever make the "torture[d]"7
suggestion that stops and frisks somehow lay "outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment"? The answer is that some folks
believed that if we called these things by their true names"searches" and "seizures"-they would be unconstitutional unless
accompanied by warrants and probable cause. Since it would not
be sensible to require that all stops and frisks be so accompanied, these folks reasoned backwards and opened with the gambit that these intrusions were simply not "searches and seizures." But had this "nonsearch" gambit succeeded, the result
would have been that stops and frisks would have been wholly
unregulated by the Fourth Amendment. The good Terry properly
and "emphatically" declined the "nonsearch" gambit, but this
emphatic move was made possible precisely because of the good
Terry's insistence that the basic Fourth Amendment mandate
was not the warrant, not probable cause, but reasonableness. In
other words, the more wooden and inflexible the requirements of
the Fourth Amendment, the higher the likely threshold of
"searches and seizures." If all "searches" and "seizures" require
warrants and/or probable cause, judges will strain to deny that
metal detectors and luggage x-rays at airports, border-crossing
checkpoints, and countless other intrusions less than arrests and
full-blown rummagings are truly "searches" and "seizures."
Conversely, if the Fourth Amendment does not invariably and
inflexibly require probable cause and warrants, then judges will
be willing to honestly identify more minor intrusions as
"searches" and "seizures" triggering the Amendment. Thus, the
good Terry explicitly linked its generous understanding of
"searches and seizures" to its embrace of reasonableness:
[The nonsearch gambit] seeks to isolate from constitu6

Id. at 16-17 (footnotes omitted).

Id. at 16.
8 Id.
7

1102

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:1097

tional scrutiny the initial stages of the contact beween
[sic] the policeman and the citizen. And by suggesting a
rigid all-or-nothing model of justification and regulation
under the Amendment, it obscures the utility of limitations upon the scope, as well as the initiation, of police
action as a means of constitutional regulation. This Court
has held in the past that a search which is reasonable at
its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and [its] scope.... [The
nonsearch gambit] serve[s] to divert attention from the
central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment-the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular
governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security. 9
Yet what the good Terry explicitly gave, the bad Terry implicitly took away. The Court identified its "first task" as establishing "at what point" on the facts of the case "the Fourth
Amendment [became] relevant.""0 The good Terry made clear
that when Officer McFadden "initiat[ed] ...physical contact""
with the citizen, the Amendment came into play, but the bad
Terry implied that until that point of contact, the Amendment
had nothing to say. Recall that before initiating contact, Officer
McFadden had purposefully surveilled the citizen for about ten
to twelve uninterrupted minutes. Why wasn't this sustained and
purposeful surveillance a "search" if we seek a broad definition of
Fourth Amendment protections?
Ordinary language surely
would permit, even if it does not demand, this generous definition. The Oxford English Dictionary, for example, includes the
following as one of its definitions of the verb "search": "[tlo look
scrutinizingly at.' 12 The Oxford English Dictionary goes on to
include as an example a phrase from Justice Holmes's father
(small world, isn't it?): "He searched her features through and
through." 3 On this view, wasn't Officer McFadden "searching"
Mr. Terry's features through and through when the officer took
up his observation post to "look scrutinizingly at" Mr. Terry?
Of course, to call McFadden's initial surveillance a search is
not to say it was an unconstitutional search. To be sure, McFadden's initial gazing was without a warrant, and without probable
9 Id. at 17-19 (footnote omitted).
'0 Id. at 16.

"Id. at 19 n.16.
14 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 806 (2d ed. 1989).
13Id.
"

1998]

FOURTHAMENDMENT FIRST PRINCIPLES

1103

cause, but as we have seen, the good Terry insisted that "the central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment" is not the warrant,
not probable cause, but "reasonableness in all the circumstances." 4 And there are obvious circumstances that render
McFadden's initial surveillance reasonable, such as: Its relatively short length, its observation of citizens on the public
streets (where one does assume a certain risk of being seen by
strangers), its relatively unobtrusive and nonhumiliating character, its absence of high-tech video or audio magnification devices,
and its bona fide purpose (to ferret out street crime rather than,
say, to harass opposition politicians). But if we change some of
these circumstances, at some point surveillance could violate the
Fourth Amendment-if, say, McFadden stalked a citizen for
weeks on end, or used fancy remote microphones to eavesdrop on
her every word (even mutterings under her breath), or stood just
outside her first-floor apartment and peeped through the blinds
into her bedroom. (Assume that in each case, McFadden could
point to no reason whatsoever for the surveillance, but simply
insisted that because these intrusions were not Fourth Amendment "searches," no good reason was needed.) Of course, one
might say that these hypotheticals merely show that at some
point a surveillance "nonsearch" becomes a "search," but it seems
more sensible to say that at some point a "reasonable" surveillance search becomes "unreasonable." It would be an exaggeration (though a nicely alliterative one) to say that the "nonsearch" approach was "non-sense," but surely the "non-search"
approach is precisely an "all-or-nothing model" that "isolate[s]
from constitutional scrutiny the initial stages of [interaction] between the policeman and the citizen" 5-- the very model, that is,
that the good Terry explicitly urged us to reject.
Why then, didn't the bad Terry follow the logic of the good
Terry by calling surveillance itself a "search" and then focusing
on its "intensity" and "scope" when measured against the standard of reasonableness? Perhaps because such a recognition
would have forced the Court to make clear that some searches
might be reasonable even in the absence of individualized suspicion. Recall that, at the very beginning of his visual interaction
with Mr. Terry, Officer McFadden had, at most, a subjective
hunch, a feeling, rather than some measurable quantum of ob14

Terry, 392 U.S. at 19.

15Id. at 17.
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jective, individualized suspicion based on specific facts: "He had
never seen the two men before, and he was unable to say precisely what first drew his eye to them." 8 The good Terry was
clear that searches need not always be accompanied by probable
cause, but the bad Terry was somewhat unclear about whether
searches unaccompanied by any individualized suspicion are
ever permissible. In at least one passage, Terry could be read to
say that only "specific" facts implicating specific persons could
justify searches, and
that "subjective" and "inarticulate hunches"
17
could never suffice.

The bad Terry's obvious problem here is that if, as the good
Terry admitted, the Fourth Amendment's words and common
sense do not invariably require warrants and probable cause,
neither do they invariably require individualized suspicion (a
phrase, of course, that nowhere appears in the Amendment itself). Metal detectors at airports and in courtrooms, for example,
are constitutionally reasonable when we consider all the circumstances-they are relatively unintrusive and nonhumiliating,
justified by legitimate safety concerns, and used in ways that
treat all citizens alike. If we insist that reasonable searches
must always have a certain quantum of individualized suspicion,
we will simply recreate, at a different level, the same "all-ornothing" approach that will generate hydraulic pressure to define certain searches as nonsearches, and thus wrongly isolate
them from proper reasonableness review of their intensity,
scope, justification, evenhandedness, and so on. To the extent
the bad Terry dicta of "specificity" could be read to demand individualized suspicion, it undermined precisely what was right
about the good Terry.
An invariable requirement of individualized suspicion not
only lacks textual roots, and offends common sense, but also flies
in the face of constitutional history. The First Congress, which
drafted the Fourth Amendment, passed at least two statutes
that provided for searches and seizures in the absence of individualized suspicion. The first statute authorized federal customs officers to board and search-without warrants, without
probable cause, and without individualized suspicion-all ships
within four leagues of the coast; 8 and the second statute
'6 Id. at 5.
17Id. at 21-22.
18Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, §§ 31, 64, 1 Stat. 145, 164, 175 (repealed 1799).
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authorized warrantless and suspicionless entry into and inspection of all "houses, store-houses, ware-houses, buildings and
places" 9 that had been registered (as required by law) as liquor
storerooms or distilleries. If anyone in the First Congress
deemed these statutes unconstitutional, modern scholars have
yet to find him. At least one modern scholar has tried to explain
away some of this history by saying that "ships" were not
"effects" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."0 But
this is precisely the "nonsearch" gambit that the good Terry
rightly rejected. If ships are not protected by the Amendment,
what about cars? What about phone conversations? What about
anything other than persons, houses, and papers? Taken seriously, this gambit threatens to place much of the world beyond
"the purview of the Fourth Amendment."2 ' It takes the broad
word "effects"-designed as an inclusive catchall sweeping all
important stuff into the Fourth Amendment-and turns it upside down and inside out. And as an effort to explain away certain historical cases as situations where the Fourth Amendment
did not apply, it fails miserably. Surely the persons on ships
were "persons" yet they too were detained-seized, temporarilyunder the ship statute. Surely the "houses, store-houses, [and]
ware-houses"22 regulated by the distillery statute were "houses"
of sorts-though obviously deserving of less privacy than a
purely private abode. To move from history to the present day,
surely persons who pass through metal detectors at airports and
through border checkpoints are Fourth Amendment "persons"
(and their bags x-rayed at airports are Fourth Amendment
"effects") but this should not trigger an inflexible rule of warrants or probable cause, or even individualized suspicion. Here,
the non-search gambit is, quite simply, non-sense.

This Act is discussed in United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 584
(1983) (upholding boarding and inspection, without warrant and without suspicion
of wrongdoing, of ships in U.S. waters with access to high seas).
19 Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, § 29, 1 Stat. 199, 206 (1791).
20 I refer here to Thomas Y. Davies. For more discussion,
see Akhil Reed Amar,
The FourthAmendment, Boston, and the Writs of Assistance, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
53, 68-69 (1996).
21 Terry, 392 U.S. at 16.
22

§ 29, 1 Stat. at 206.
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II. ARE WARRANTS AND PROBABLE CAUSE REQUIRED FOR ALL
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES?

Assuming that government has triggered the Fourth
Amendment by engaging in a "search" or "seizure," the obvious
next question is what the Fourth Amendment requires. The
good Terry seemed emphatic in its insistence that "the central
inquiry under the Fourth Amendment" is "reasonableness in all
the circumstances."" Indeed, we have already noted that when it
quoted the words of the Fourth Amendment, the Terry Court
simply ended the quotation after the reasonableness clause, reducing the remainder of the Amendment-which speaks of warrants and probable cause-to an ellipsis.' For many lawyers,
scholars, and judges today, this elliptical quotation is nothing
less than scandalous. For they assume that the reasonableness
clause cannot be understood in isolation-it gains its true
meaning only when read alongside the warrant clause. Concretely, these "warrantists" assume that the two clauses are
linked by an implicit idea that all searches and seizures without
warrants are unreasonable (at least presumptively).
But there are several problems with this "warrantist" reading of the Amendment. First, it is not what the words of the
Amendment say. Second, no Framer ever said that this is what
the Amendment did or should mean. Third, no early treatise
said that all warrantless searches and seizures were (even presumptively) illegitimate. Fourth, many early state constitutions
featured search and seizure provisions, yet none of these said
that all searches and seizures required (even presumptively)
warrants. Fifth, several early state cases construing these state
constitutional counterparts explicitly rejected the notion of a
general warrant requirement, and no early state case--or federal
case, for that matter-embraced the idea. Sixth, a large number
of historical examples give the lie to the idea that warrants were
always required at the Founding-warrantless arrests, searches
incident to warrantless arrest, searches of ships, searches of liquor store-houses, border searches, successful seizures of contraband and stolen goods, and on and on. Seventh, if the warrant
requirement is merely presumptive, it is far from clear how and
why the presumption is to be rebutted. To infer a (presumptive)
"Terry, 392 U.S. at 19.
2 See id.
at 8.
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warrant requirement and then to infer a set of exceptions to that
(presumptive) requirement is to do an awful lot of inferring and
very little reading: In effect, it is to rewrite the Amendment
rather than to read it as written (and intended). Eighth, without
a fairly elaborate set of exceptions to a (presumptive) warrant
requirement, the Amendment would simply defy common sense:
In the real world there are a vast number of intrusions ill-suited
for warrants. This is especially evident if searches and seizures
are defined broadly, consistently with the good Terry. Many of
these intrusions-such as metal detectors at airports, bordercrossing checkpoints, and plain-view limited public surveillance
h la Officer McFadden-are reasonable even though they lack
probable cause or even individualized suspicion, and thus no
warrant could ever authorize them. Ninth, in the three decades
since Terry, and especially in the last few years, the Supreme
Court has often (though not always) read the Amendment in
keeping with the good Terry, emphasizing reasonableness, rather
than warrants and probable cause as the Amendment's central
mandate. Tenth, the emphasis on warrants as the central
Fourth Amendment safeguard ignores the ways in which these
ex parte instruments, which issue without notice or opportunity
to be heard and which exert preclusive force in later proceedings,
actually pose distinct threats to liberty that certain warrantless
searches do not.
These are not the only problems, but ten is a nice round
number, and life is short. Elsewhere, I have tried to elaborate
these and other problems of the so-called warrant requirement,
and I shall not try to rehash all this here.' But before I return
to Terry, perhaps it might be helpful to briefly survey some of the
recent scholarly efforts to revive the warrant requirement, and
to say why none of these efforts moves me in the slightest.
A. An Interlude
My friend Professor Morgan Cloud has suggested that history is often indeterminate, and can be read in different ways.26
2See
generally Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107
HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994); Amar, supra note 20. The Harvard article is reprinted,

with modest revisions, in

AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES (1997) [hereinafter CRIMINAL PROCEDURE]. Still

more material appears in AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION (1998).
26 See Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History; Searchingfor History, 63 U.
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True enough, but this does not change the fact that the Fourth
Amendment text does not require warrants; and Professor Cloud
cannot point to any specific founding-era historical sourceFramer, pamphlet, treatise, state constitution, case, etc.-that
says something like the following: "[Aill searches and seizures
require warrants (at least presumptively)." Where's the beef? If
history is often as fuzzy and cloudy as the good professor suggests, his lack of specific evidence seems all the more striking.
For even if we did ever find a few stray statements supporting
the warrant requirement, we would have to weigh these against
the great weight of contrary textual, historical, structural and
practical evidence.
Consider next the views of Professor Thomas Y. Davies, who
has railed against the idea, forcefully evident in Terry's elliptical
quotation of the Fourth Amendment, that reasonableness can be
understood as a "free-standing" requirement rather than as a
shorthand for a warrant." Davies's apparent argument is that
the grammar of the Amendment implies that all warrantless
searches and seizures are ipso facto "unreasonable" (at least presumptively). But as I have shown elsewhere, major prototypes of
the Fourth Amendment stressed freestanding reasonableness as
the central inquiry. Richard Henry Lee put forth the following
proposal, which I quote in its entirety without ellipsis: "That the
Citizens shall not be exposed to unreasonable searches, seizures
of their papers, houses, persons, or property."" And here is an
early proposal from the prominent Anti-Federalist, the Federal
Farmer: "[A man should be] subject to no unreasonable searches
or seizures of his person, papers or effects."29 A similar freestanding reasonableness proposal surfaced in the Massachusetts
ratifying convention, protecting the people against "unreasonable
searches and seizures of their persons, papers, or possessions. " "
(Note also how all these proposals use broad residual language"property," "effects," and "possessions"-to sweep in all imporCHI. L. REV. 1707 (1996).
27 Davies's views appear in testimony before a Senate committee,
and are discussed in Amar, supra note 20.
28

13 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION

238-39 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981) (Lee's proposed
amendments, September 27, 1787).
29 Letters from the Federal Farmer VI (1787) in
5 COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION at 274 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1995).
"0DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONVENTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
MASSACHUSETTS HELD IN THE YEAR 1788, at 86-87 (Boston, William White, 1856).
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tant stuff, not to keep out ships, etc.)

Of course, in our Fourth Amendment, the reasonableness
clause, though grammatically freestanding, is appended (via a
comma) to a second clause that addresses warrants. Isn't it evident that the implicit logical linkage between these two clauses
is that all warrantless searches are therefore unreasonable? No.
As I have explained elsewhere, the logical linkage is precisely
the reverse: Warrants lacking in probable cause (and the other
requisites specified in the second clause) are therefore unreasonable within the meaning of the first clause. If we seek to logically link the two clauses of the Fourth Amendment, it is the
overbroad warrant, not the warrantless search, that is ipso facto
unreasonable. This reading fits precisely the words of the
Amendment. It also tracks perfectly the earlier language of the
celebrated Article XIV of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780
and its 1784 New Hampshire Constitution look-alike. 3' Each of
these documents laid down a grammatically freestanding reasonableness requirement in a stand-alone sentence. Each then
appended a second sentence limiting warrants, a sentence in
which overbroad warrants are explicitly identified as "contrary
to this right"-that is, contrary to the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures. It is clear, then, that what is unreason3' The similarity between the two articles is striking. Article Fourteen of the
Massachusetts Constitution provided:
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and
seizures, of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions. All
warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation of
them be not previously supported by oath or affirmation; and if the order
in the warrant to a civil officer, to make search in suspected places, or to
arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize their property, be not accompanied with a special designation of the persons or objects of search,
arrest, or seizure: and no warrant ought to be issued but in cases, and with
the formalities prescribed by the laws.
MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. XIV.
Article Nineteen of the New Hampshire Constitution provided:
Every subject hath a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and
seizures of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions. All
warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation of
them be not previously supported by oath, or affirmation; and if the order
in the warrant to a civil officer, to make search in suspected places, or to
arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize their property, be not accompanied with a special designation of the persons or objects of search,
arrest, or seizure; and no warrant ought to be issued but in cases, and with
the formalities prescribed by the laws.
N.H. CONST. of 1784, art. XIX, reprinted in 6 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTIONS 346 (William F. Swindler ed., 1976).

1110

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:1097

able in these documents is the overbroad warrant, not the warrantless search. During the debate over the ratification of the
Federal Constitution, the influential Federal Farmer echoed
these documents:
[Tihat all persons shall have a right to be secure from all
unreasonable searches and seizures of their persons,
houses, papers, or possessions; and that all warrants
shall be deemed contrary to this right, if the foundation of
them be not previously supported by oath, and there be
of persons or objects of
32
designation
not in them a special
seizure.
or
search, arrest,
In all three state ratifying conventions that put forth prototypes of the Fourth Amendment, the overbroad warrant, not the
warrantless search, is condemned as unreasonable, as is evident
from their use of the word "therefore."33 And in early drafts of
the Amendment in the First Congress, all this is confirmed and
taken one step further-indeed, a step too far. When these
drafts proclaimed that the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures "shall not be violated by" 34 overbroad warrants,

overbroad warrants were surely condemned as unreasonable;
but, alas, they were the only unreasonable intrusions condemned. As finally written, the grammatically free-standing
reasonableness clause applies not merely to condemn the overbroad warrant, but also to regulate all searches and seizures,
even warrantless ones. And this grammatically free-standing
clause regulates them not by invariably requiring warrants, but
by demanding reasonableness. To the extent that the good Terry
helps us see all this-by quoting the grammatically free-standing
language as free-standing, by highlighting reasonableness as the
"central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment,"35 and by stressing the regulatory role of this ideal even in warrantless situations-the good Terry is very good indeed.
32

Letters from The Federal Farmer XVI (1788), in 2

THE COMPLETE ANTI-

FEDERALIST at 328 (Herbert J. Storing & Murray Dry eds., 1981).
33 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 658 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1888) (Virginia) ("That every
freeman has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures of his
person, his papers, and property; all warrants, therefore, [lacking certain safeguards] are grievous and oppressive... [and] dangerous ... ."); id. at 328, 335 (New
York and North Carolina) (similar).
34 1 THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
STATES

436 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
3"Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968).
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But if overbroad warrants are so bad-ipso facto unreasonable-why are warrantless intrusions ever any better? If a warrant lacking probable cause is plainly unreasonable and unconstitutional, why would a warrantless search or seizure equally
lacking probable cause ever be any more constitutionally acceptable? So asks my friend Professor Tracey Maclin in work that
attempts to rebut my own. Like Professors Cloud and Davies,
Professor Maclin seeks to quarrel with my historical account, but
like the others, he is unable to produce even a single early
statement to the effect that "warrants are always required" or
that "warrants are presumptively required." Not one! And in a
72-page article! But even if we lack specific historical support
for a warrant requirement and a probable cause requirement, he
suggests, surely we should take seriously the larger principles at
work. If the Framers despised general-that is, overbroadwarrants, why wouldn't they, if they thought about it carefully,
have likewise despised "warrantlesssearches exhibiting the same
characteristicsthat marked general warrants?""
The one-paragraph answer, which I have elsewhere elaborated and documented in many paragraphs, is that warrantless
searches, by definition, never exhibited the same characteristics:
Warrants, by definition, conferred certain immunities on government searches and seizures that did not come into play when
these intrusions occurred without a warrant. A warrant typically issued without notice and opportunity to be heard, and immunized the bearer of the warrant from the tort suit that the
citizen target of the search would otherwise have been free to
bring. If officers searched with a valid warrant, they could not
be sued for simply carrying out that warrant within its terms;
however, if they lacked a warrant and nonetheless decided to
search or seize, they risked a trespass lawsuit, in which a civil
jury would typically decide whether their search or seizure was
reasonable. And so any given search or seizure, if conducted
pursuant to a warrant, was to that extent more dangerous and
troubling-because immune from after-the-fact review and
oversight in tort suits-than that very same search or seizure
conducted without a warrant.
With this background in mind, let us now turn to a revealing
but rather confused passage that appears in a recent review of
"6Tracey Macln, When the Cure for the FourthAmendment is Worse Than the
Disease,68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 12 (1994).
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my book on constitutional criminal procedure, a review authored
by my old friend Professor George C. Thomas III. He asks why a
presumptive warrant requirement couldn't be defended by the
Court by saying something like the following:
Look, we don't know what the Framers intended, and we
have no idea how to craft from scratch a doctrine of
Fourth Amendment reasonableness that will have clarity
and bite. But the Framers clearly contemplated a tightly
regulated role for warrants, and we will therefore interpret reasonable [ness] to mean a rebuttable presumption
that all searches must be accompanied by a warrant. And
to help clarify what rebuts that presumption, we will
group the searches that do not need warrants into categories. Then we will say that all searches must be accompanied by a warrant except those in a few welldelineated categories. 7
Professor Thomas's first clause is not a promising start. If
judges don't know what the Framers intended, what follows? I
would suggest that, as a first step, perhaps the judges should
read the words of the Constitution more carefully and seriously
ponder the lessons of history. (Perhaps my book could help
here.) It surely does not follow that judges should make up silly
rules and impose them on the rest of us as inflexible constitutional mandates that bear little or no resemblance to the document authorized by We the People. Surely Professor Thomas
would not endorse the following sentences: "Look, we don't know
what the Constitution means, so we'll just do whatever we
please.... By the way, we hereby decide that the moon is made
of green cheese." In short, confessing cluelessness is not a good
way for judges to begin telling the rest of society how it must
run. Things do not improve much in Professor Thomas's second
clause, which also elevates cluelessness into a judicial virtue. If
judges truly "have no idea how to begin" crafting a serious doctrine of reasonableness, why should the rest of us pay any attention to them? And the issue is not, of course, constructing
such a reasonableness doctrine "from scratch," as Thomas
wrongly implies. Rather, judges have all the resources of the legal tradition to build on-constitutional principles expressed
elsewhere in the document, the teachings of history and tradi37 George C. Thomas III, Remapping the CriminalProcedure Universe,
83 VA. L.
REV. 1819, 1832 (1997) (reviewing AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES (1997)).
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tion, norms evident elsewhere in the legal, moral, social, and political landscape, the dictates of common sense, and so on. In
short, it is simply foolish to posit that thoughtful judges could
not sensibly fashion a reasonableness framework, building on
what I have elsewhere called common sense reasonableness and
constitutional reasonableness. Indeed, as I shall show below, the
good Terry began to outline some of the basic features of that
framework. A final point about Professor Thomas's unpromising
first sentence: It bears no resemblance whatsoever to what the
Justices actually said in the main opinions that laid the modern
foundation for the warrant requirement. These opinions-the
majority opinions in Trupiano and Johnson, and Justice Frankfurter's dissents in Harris and Davis, for example-were based
on precisely the opposite idea of Thomas's: "We know precisely
what the Framers intended, and what they intended was that all
searches and seizures be accompanied by warrants, at least
wherever practical. That is the obvious, if implicit, textual command of the words of the Fourth Amendment."38 Now, the Justices were plainly wrong about this, I have argued. But the doctrine Professor Thomas seeks to defend is based not on
confessions of cluelessness, but rather on confident (albeit erroneous) arguments rooted in text and original intent.
In short, Professor Thomas's entire first sentence is a nonstarter. But his second sentence is even worse-for it gets constitutional history and structure (not to mention text) precisely
upside down. As we have seen, the Framers contemplated a
tightly regulated role for warrants because in important respects
searches under warrants were worse and more dangerous than
warrantless actions. Using this concern as a basis for a presumptive warrant requirement is like saying the following:
Look, we're really clueless about freedom of the press, but
since we know there was concern about prior restraints,
we will therefore require these restraints whenever possible. We're also clueless about due process, but since we
know there was concern about notice and the opportunity
to be heard, we will therefore require ex parte proceedings wherever possible. Oh, and bench trials too, since
38 My words here are a paraphrase of the following
cases: Trupiano v. United
States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948);
Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 161-62 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting);
Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 595, 602, 605, 609 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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we're clueless about juries, but we know that there was
concern about judges.
In the remainder of his confused passage, my friend George
Thomas in effect rewrites the Fourth Amendment. Here, at the
end, we have something that does, in a sense, follow from the
opening clause of this passage, but it is not a pretty picture:
"Look, we're clueless ... so we'll just make stuff up."

I think

that we can do better than this, and that Terry can help us in our
efforts. Let us then, return to Terry.
B. Terry Again

Recall that the good Terry insisted on reasonableness as the
"central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment."39 But the bad
Terry tended to undercut this: "We do not retreat from our holdings that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance
judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant
procedure, or that in most instances failure to comply with the
warrant requirement can only be excused by exigent circumstances." ° Why, then was Officer McFadden's warrantless intrusion permissible? Apparently because of "exigent"-that is,
urgent-circumstances. Officer McFadden simply did not have
time to get to a judge and ask for a warrant. Stops and frisks,
said the Court, involved "necessarily swift action predicated
upon the on-the-spot observations" 1 of officers on the beat.
These swiftly unfolding situations, said the Court, could not "as
a practical matter" 2 be subjected to the warrant procedure. Real
time moves too fast for judges here, Terry suggested.
But the obvious problem with this argument-which tries to
work within a basically "warrantist" framework-is that it can
justify a stop and frisk only if such an intrusion is accompanied
by probable cause. For if probable cause exists, then the urgency
argument works: If McFadden had only had the time, he could
and would have sought a warrant, and a judge could and would
have issued a warrant. Since he did not have the time (through
no fault of his own-these situations are "necessarily swift"), we
will allow him to do what a sensible neutral magistrate would
have authorized him to do, via a warrant, had there been enough
Terry, 392 U.S. at 19.
Id. at 20 (citations omitted).
41 Id. (emphasis added).
39
40

42 Id.
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time. But even if McFadden had been blessed with all the time
in the world-even if the judge had been standing at McFadden's
side, warrant pad and pen in hand-a judge could not have issued a warrant in the absence of probable cause. The words of
the warrant clause, which the Terry Court never quoted (and
perhaps now we can begin to see an unattractive explanation for
this omission), are emphatic and unambiguous on this point: "no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause .. ." (My ellipsis

and emphasis, of course.)
This is precisely the point where Justice Douglas, in lonely
dissent in Terry, started hopping up and down:
I agree that petitioner was "seized" within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. I also agree that frisking petitioner and his companions for guns was a "search." But it
is a mystery how that "search" and that "seizure" can be
constitutional by Fourth Amendment standards, unless
there was "probable cause" .... The opinion of the Court
disclaims the existence of "probable cause."... Had a
warrant been sought, a magistrate would, therefore, have
been unauthorized to issue one, for he can act only if
there is a showing of "probable cause." We hold today
that the police have greater authority to make a "seizure"
and conduct a "search" than a judge has to authorize such
action .... To give power to the police to seize a person
on some grounds different from or less than "probable
cause" would be handing them more authority than could
be exercised by a magistrate in issuing a warrant to seize
a person."
What is the Terry majority's response to this argument? Silence. This is bad indeed. For there is a compelling response to
Douglas that is available-but it tends to call into question (or at
least recast) the warrant requirement cases from which the bad
Terry refused to retreat. The compelling response would go
something like this:
It is a "mystery" to our sole dissenting colleague how
we today can uphold a "search" and "seizure" in the conceded absence of "probable cause," but the mystery is
easily solved by examining the Fourth Amendment's text,
and by consulting common sense. Textually, "probable
cause" is not a global requirement for all searches and
43U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
4

Terry, 392 U.S. at 35-36 & n.3 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
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seizures, but only a requirement for warrants. As our elliptical quotation should make clear, the global, freestanding command of the Fourth Amendment is not that
all searches and seizures be conducted pursuant to warrants, or be accompanied by probable cause, but rather
that all searches and seizures be reasonable. Certain intrusions may be reasonable even if lacking in probable
cause-for example, where the government need is especially weighty (imagine a 1% chance of finding a bomb, or
on the facts of the case at hand, recall the need to assure
the personal safety of Officer McFadden), or the search is
minimally intrusive and nondiscriminatory (imagine
metal detectors in the airports of the future). There is a
long and unbroken history of various reasonable searches
lacking probable cause-border searches, inspections of
regulated businesses, periodic building code inspections of
homes and apartments, public school regimens, and
countless more. If we wrongly insist that all searches and
seizures must be accompanied by probable cause, there
are only four possible outcomes, and none is constitutionally attractive. First, we will stick to this strict rule,
and render much of the world-the reasonable world, the
necessary world-unconstitutional. This would be madness. Second, we will proliferate ad hoc exceptions rather
than admitting that we have simply misframed the initial
rule. This would be unprincipled. Third, we will dishonestly label some searches "non-searches." This would be
precisely the "all-or-nothing" "torture[d]" word-game that
we emphatically reject today. Fourth, we will water down
the concept of "probable cause," saying that in some cases
mere individualized suspicion, or even a complete absence
of suspicion, can count as "probable" enough (wink). But
once we have done that, we will necessarily be authorizing warrantsto issue on this winking, watered-down concept. If that happens, we will have betrayed the central
textual command of the second clause of the Fourth
Amendment: We would be allowing warrants on something less than true probable cause. In other words, we
would be authorizing general warrants-precisely the evil
the Framers meant to reject in the second clause.
These last points require more elaboration, and prompt
us to explain the seeming anomaly that so troubles our
dissenting colleague. Various searches may properly take
place even though they could not properly be authorized by
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a warrant. Because warrants at the founding issued ex
parte, and pre-empted the possibility of various after-thefact opportunities for judicial review of the search, warrants were carefully hedged by certain limitations that
did not apply to warrantless action. By analogy, temporary restraining orders (TROs), because they issue ex
parte, are hedged by certain limitations that do not apply
outside the TRO context. Warrants at the founding could
issue only for inherently suspicious items like stolen
goods, and contraband. Of course this did not mean that
"mere evidence" could not be "seized" but only that a warrant could not issue for innocent "mere evidence" in the
hands of a person not suspected of personal wrongdoing.
A subpoena duces tecum may issue for such "mere evidence," and it would be sheer torture of the English language to suggest that such a subpoena is not a "seizure"
of sorts. Moreover, a subpoena may often issue in the absence of "probable cause"-consider a grand jury's typical
subpoenas, which issue precisely to determine whether
there exists "probable cause" to believe that a crime has
occurred. Of course, a subpoena is far less intrusive than
a surprise search and seizure pursuant to a warrantwhich is one of the reasons it may issue on a less stringent showing. But it is yet another example of a reasonable "search" or "seizure" in the absence of probable
cause.
To put the point yet another way, the warrant clause
dealt only with searches for stolen goods, contraband and
the like, and with full-blown arrests. Where only property interests in recovering goods was at stake, and where
highly intrusive full-blown arrests were involved,
"probable cause" struck a sensible-a reasonablebalance of interests. But where human life is at riskOfficer McFadden's life in today's case-and where the intrusion on the citizen falls well short of a full-blown arrest, it would be silly to insist that the balance struck in
the arrest and stolen goods context is the only reasonable
balance for the very different kind of search and seizure
at hand today. To wrench the words "probable cause" out
of their proper context-governing warrants-and to
press them into service as the global requirement of all
searches and seizures is to flout text, ignore history, and
defy common sense.
In light of what we have said, it should now be clear
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that in a wide range of cases, searches and seizures will
and may take place even though a warrant could never issue (because probable cause is absent). This is still another way of proving that there could never be a truly
global warrant requirement for all searches and seizures.
To the extent that our earlier cases set forth a global warrant requirement (and thus a global probable cause requirement) as an implication of the text of the Fourth
Amendment, or as dictated (or even supported) by its
original intent, we now confess error. But we need not retreat from the basic holdings of many of these cases, on
their facts. Police departments raise special concerns
that justify special judicial supervision and scrutiny. In a
wide variety of situations, a regime of ex ante judicial
oversight can help prevent police overzealousness, and
thereby make citizens more secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects. If we are speaking precisely,
we need not and should not call this judicial oversight
regime a "warrant requirement;" indeed it would be better for civil liberty if this ex ante oversight occurred in
addition to, rather than instead of, the possibility of afterthe-fact review. (As revised, the regime would involve
pre-clearance, but not preclusion.) But in any event, the
category of police conduct that we address today does not
lend itself to such ex ante review, given the necessarily
swift actions involved. And in the case at hand, there are
other aspects of the interaction, that make it reasonable,
constitutionally speaking.
And what are those features, you ask? Here, the good Terry
was not quite so mute, as I shall now try to elaborate.
III. WHAT SHOULD "REASONABLENESS" MEAN?

Reasonableness is a spacious concept. Of course, this is one
of its virtues. Precisely because the Fourth Amendment tries to
regulate such a vast and protean set of governmental action(broadly defined) "searches" and "seizures" coming in many sizes
and shapes, with different purposes and risks, administered by a
wide variety of different government agents and agencies, over
decades and even centuries-the Amendment is properly cast in
general, spacious language. Elsewhere, I have tried to lay out a
framework for taking Fourth Amendment reasonableness seriously, a framework based on what I have called "common sense
reasonableness" and "constitutional reasonableness."
Once
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again, it is not my aim today to rehash all of what I have said
elsewhere; for present purposes, a few basic points should suffice.
Because of the judicially-created exclusionary rule (about
which I shall say a few words later), most lawyers, scholars, and
judges today assimilate the Fourth Amendment into the domain
of criminal procedure. But this is largely a mistake. For unlike,
say, most of the Fifth Amendment and all of the Sixth, which
explicitly regulate criminal matters, the Fourth Amendment
speaks to all government action. Searches and seizures to enforce civil laws are no less covered than searches and seizures to
enforce criminal laws. And on the remedy side, the exclusion of
criminal evidence was neither provided for by the Amendment,
nor contemplated by any of its Framers or early interpreters.
How then was the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and overbroad warrants to be enforced? As we have already noted, by civil trespass suits brought by citizens whose
"persons, houses, papers, and effects"45 were unconstitutionally
invaded. The tort law model is not only evident from history, but
also deducible from a close reading of text: It is, after all, tort
law that generally secures persons against invasions of their
persons, houses, papers, and effects. So rather than conceptualizing the Amendment as constitutional criminal procedure, it is
more precise, and helpful, to see it as constitutional tort law.
To some extent, then, tort law concepts of reasonableness
may help give meaning to Fourth Amendment reasonableness.
However, the Amendment is not mere tort law but constitutional
tort law. The ordinary tort law rules applicable to private persons may not always sensibly apply when we deal with government officials who are both entitled to do things that private
persons generally may not (levy taxes, for example) and barred
from doing things private persons may sometimes do (practice
race discrimination, for example). When we recall that it is a
Constitution that we are expounding-a single document designed to cohere, rather than a grab bag of random clauses jumbled together-we see the obvious need to construe the broad
reasonableness language of the Fourth Amendment in light of
rules and principles affirmed elsewhere in the document. In this
model of constitutional reasonableness, Fourth Amendment doctrine must be crafted to safeguard basic constitutional values
45

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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such as free expression, privacy, property, due process, equality,
democratic participation, and the like. Common sense understandings of reasonableness must also play a role, both because
such understandings help inform tort law generally, and because
such understandings should be part of the interpretation of a
Constitution that speaks in the name of ordinary people. Many
sensible aspects of a proper Fourth Amendment framework of
reasonableness-the proportionality principle, and the need to
constrain police officer discretion, to take just two examples at
random-have deep roots both in technical constitutional doctrine outside the Fourth Amendment and in more general common sense.
What does Terry have to say about reasonableness? Quite a
lot, if we read with care. Although the Terry Court was not particularly systematic or comprehensive, it did-in good common
law fashion responding to the facts at hand-identify some of the
most important elements of Fourth Amendment reasonableness.
Let us begin by considering what I shall call the proportionality principle:
More serious intrusions require more
weighty justifications. In the Court's words:
[The scope of the particular intrusion, in light of all the
exigencies of the case, [is] a central element in the analysis of reasonableness. Focusing the inquiry squarely on
the dangers and demands of the particular situation also
seems more likely to produce rules which are intelligible
to the police and the public alike ....
...[A] search which is reasonable in its inception may
violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable
intensity and scope. The scope of the search must be
"strictly tied to and justified by" the circumstances which
rendered its initiation permissible ....46 [T]here is "no
ready test for determining reasonableness other than by
balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails." 7
A few quick points about the Court's insights here. First,
the Court focused on both the depth and the breadth of an intrusion-on its "intensity" and "scope." On intensity, for example, the Court quoted the following "apt description" of the frisk:
46Terry,
47

392 U.S. at 17-19 & n.15 (citations omitted).

Id. at 21 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967))

(second and third alterations from original).
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" '[The officer must feel with sensitive fingers every portion of
the prisoner's body. A thorough search must be made of the
prisoner's arms and armpits, waistline and back, the groin and
area about the testicles, and entire surface of the legs down to
the feet.' , Nevertheless, said the Court, the intensity of a typical frisk was less than that of a typical search incident to arrest,
since the latter can "involve a relatively extensive exploration of
the person"4 9 for things other than weapons-evidence, fruits,
and so on. On scope, the Court stressed that the typical frisk is
a far more 'rief... intrusion upon the sanctity of the person"5 '
than a typical arrest.
Second, and related, the Court used reasonableness not just
to examine the initiation of the intrusion, but the entirety of the
transaction. This common-sense approach has deep roots in constitutional history. In one of the landmark English cases that
set the stage for the Fourth Amendment, the 1765 case of Money
v. Leach,5 Lord Mansfield acknowledged that the four-day detention of printer Dryden Leach raised questions not only about
the existence of "probable cause or ground of suspicion" 2 to arrest, but also about whether the official "detained the plaintiff an
unreasonabletime."53 In a companion case, Huckle v. Money,'
tried before soon-to-be Lord Camden, the defendants sought to
emphasize that though the journeyman printer in that case had
been kept in custody for "about six hours" he had been handled
55
"very civilly" and "treat[ed] ... with beef-steaks and beer."
Third, the proportionality principle looks not only at the
depth and breadth of the entire intrusion, but measures these
against the depth and breadth of the legitimate governmental
need at hand. The existence of a genuine threat to the personal
safety of police officers-a threat not present in many ordinary
searches and arrests-very much affected the proper balance to
be struck in frisk cases, Terry explained:
We are now concerned with more than the governmental
Id. at 17 n.13 (quoting L.L. Priar & T.F. Martin, Searching and Disarming
Criminals,45 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 481, 481 (1954)).
49 Id. at 25.
"0Id. at 26.
r' 97 Eng. Rep. 1075 (KB. 1765).
C2 Id. at 1087.
m Id. (emphasis added). For more discussion of the point, see Amar, supra note
20, at 61 n.36.
' 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763).
"Id. at 768.
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interest in investigating crime; in addition, there is a
more immediate interest of the police officer in taking
steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is
dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him. Certainly it would
be unreasonable to require that police officers take unnecessary risks ....
[Even] in situations where [he] may
lack probable cause for an arrest[,] .. it would appear to
be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to
take necessary measures [upon individualized suspicion]
to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a
weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm."
Fourth, although proportionality sometimes allows intrusions on less than probable cause (as in Terry itself), at other
times proportionality should require more than probable cause.
Even though there was probable cause and a warrant in the
post-Terry case of Winston v. Lee," the proposed surgical removal
of the bullet was simply too intrusive, and the marginal evidentiary value of the bullet too slight, to justify the intrusion. And
so, under the proportionality principle, the intrusion was unreasonable. Even if the cops have probable cause to believe a citizen
has committed a minor traffic offense, should this suffice to justify an intrusive full-blown arrest, as opposed to a less intrusive
summons?58 Even if a warrant has issued, are there no limits on
the manner in which the warrant is to be reasonably executedin terms of the length of the search, its destructiveness of property, its timing (day or night), and so on? And so we see yet
again how silly it would be to see the warrant or probable
cause-rather than reasonableness-as the central building
block of sensible constitutional regulation. Those who say reasonableness is simply too vague and unworkable cannot be taken
seriously, for their logic proves too much: It suggests not simply
that warrants and probable cause are always necessary, but also
that they are always sufficient. But clearly, the second clause of
the Amendment is not sufficient to make citizens secure. We
cannot avoid taking reasonableness seriously-and the good
Terry is a good step in this direction.
Consider next Terry's promising accent on issues of bodily
integrity and personal dignity above and beyond privacy and seTerry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.1, 23-24 (1968).
U.S. 753 (1985).
See Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 267 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).

57 470
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crecy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly protects "persons"
against "unreasonable... seizures." 9 Much Fourth Amendment
doctrine sensibly safeguards legitimate interests in privacy and
secrecy, but these are not the only Fourth Amendment interests
at stake. Humiliating a citizen in a public ritual that lacks a legitimate public justification is quintessentially unreasonable, but
the privacy concept may not fully capture the unreasonableness
here. The good Terry showed keen sensitivity to all this, highlighting the risk of "harassment," expressing concern about police officers' efforts to "humiliat[e]" citizens, and noting that
frisks were "performed in public.""0 If we see the only focus of
the Fourth Amendment as the private domain--"the homeowner
closeted in his study to dispose of his secret affairs""--we miss
the ways in which the public humiliation of "the citizen on the
streets of our cities"62 is also cause for special concern, which
must be weighed in the proportionality balance. This concern
about dignity and bodily integrity can of course be teased out of
the history of the Amendment-recall the emphasis on civility in
the beer and beefsteak affair-and once again highlights the inadequacy of any approach that sees the warrant and probable
cause as the central search and seizure concepts. Even if cops
have probable cause to believe that a citizen has committed a
minor traffic offense, is it always reasonable to publicly arrest
and handcuff the citizen-even if the evident purpose is to humiliate and degrade? To the extent that the true government
purpose here may be to impose a kind of punishment before any
formal adjudication of guilt, the deep spirit of various criminal
procedure provisions outside the Fourth Amendment may indeed
be relevant to the constitutional reasonableness of such a degrading bodily seizure.
Although critics may contend that the Court should have
done even more than it did, the good Terry also deserves credit
for highlighting issues of race, issues that should be addressed in
a comprehensive framework of constitutional reasonableness.
Modern Fourth Amendment discourse, overly focused on warrants and probable cause, has had stunningly little to say about
the central issue of race; and I suggest it is not coincidental that
r9 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

60Terry, 392 U.S. at 14, 15 n.11, 17.
61 Id. at 9.
62

Id.
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one of the most direct-if still too quick-discussions of race in
all of Fourth Amendment caselaw occurred in Terry, where the
Justices finally began to focus attention on the Amendment's
first clause rather than its second. The Court expressed concern
about the "wholesale harassment by certain elements of the police community, of which minority groups, particularly Negroes,
frequently complain."63 Implicit in this quick comment is attention not merely to the race of those citizens being searched and
seized, but also to the race of those doing the searching and
seizing---"certain elements of the police community."' We might
be inspired to ask, after closely parsing this passage, if the police
department in a given case reflects the demographic makeup of
the community. If not, does that suggest a special need to be
sensitive to the heightened possibility of racial domination in
police-citizen encounters (a possibility that admittedly may also
exist in same-race encounters)? A still more comprehensive
analysis of race might be sensitive to the race of crime victims,
as my friend Professor Randall Kennedy has so powerfully noted
in his great book, Race, Crime, and the Law. Though the facts of
Terry did not directly implicate the possibility of gender oppression involved where, say, male police officers harass women
through unjustified frisking, perhaps we can hear this note, if we
listen carefully to Chief Justice Warren's phrasing in the following passage: "And it is nothing less than sheer torture of the
English language to suggest that a careful exploration of the
outer surfaces of a person's clothing all over his or her body in an
attempt to find weapons is not a 'search.' ,
Attention to issues of race and sex and possible discrimination yields a surprising thought: Sometimes equality values may
counsel a broader search or seizure, and perhaps this broader
search-though more threatening to privacy values-may be
more constitutionally reasonable because less susceptible to discrimination and discretion. If we obsess on the warrant clause,
we are likely to see the more narrow, more individualized search
as always constitutionally preferable: The clause, after all, deals
with an individualized adjudication of "probable cause" directed
at "particularly describ[ed]"66 persons and places. But as the air'Id. at 14.
64 Id.
"Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
6U.S.
CONST. amend. IV.

1998]

FOURTHAMENDMENT FIRST PRINCIPLES

1125

port metal detector illustrates, perhaps some searches may be
more constitutionally reasonable precisely when no singling out
or particularization occurs-when all must be searched, black
and white, male and female, rich and poor, rather than when
individual suspects are picked out by cops. This safety-innumbers argument has appeared quite prominently in postTerry cases like Sitz 7 and Vernonia,' but perhaps we can see a
very early prototype of the argument in Terry itself, in its evident concern with racial equality issues and its explicit distrust
of any model that would leave things utterly in the subjective
"discretion of the police."
Finally, let us note an intriguing suggestion in Terry about
whose judgments about reasonableness should count. According
to the Court, "the degree of community resentment aroused by
particular practices is clearly relevant to an assessment of the
quality of the intrusion upon reasonable expectations of personal
security caused by those practices."69 Elsewhere, I have suggested that Fourth Amendment reasonableness doctrine should
not be utterly oblivious to the common sense of common people.
The Constitution is a democratic document that speaks in the
name of the people, the Fourth Amendment itself explicitly invokes "the people," and "reasonableness" is not always a highly
technical legal concept where only judges and lawyers have wisdom. At the Founding, civil juries often played a role in helping
to define the idea of Fourth Amendment reasonableness.
(Contrary to the claims of some of my critics, I do not believeand have never said-that juries historically played, or today
should play, the sole role in giving meaning to reasonableness.)
There are of course many ways of trying to keep reasonableness
doctrine in some sync with democratic understandings-citizen
review boards, citizen ombudsmen, better use of empirical survey data, and countless others. Surely we should not put all
Fourth Amendment issues up to majority vote-especially where
issues of racial equality are at issue. But the views of what
Terry referred to as "the community" are not altogether irrelevant to reasonableness analysis, even as they are not necessarily
dispositive.
To illustrate with a perhaps controversial and admittedly
Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
"Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
69Terry, 392 U.S. at 17 n.14.
6Michigan
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oversimplified example: If, say, the great majority of the residents of a given public housing project want metal detectors in
the lobby, and continue to want them even after they have seen
them in operation, I suggest that this fact should not be ignored
in a proper reasonableness analysis conducted by judges. As
both the subjects of the search and its intended beneficiaries (as
well as its authors or authorizers, if the system is implemented
at their suggestion), the residents of the project are in a good
position to consider its reasonableness, and to assess whether it
ultimately makes them feel more or less secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects. The views of these members of the
community are worthy of respect; these views should be part of
the conversation though they need not be the last word. As
Terry nicely put the point, "the degree of community resentment
aroused by particular practices is clearly relevant.... ."'
IV. MUST ALL UNREASONABLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE BE
EXCLUDED?
Having canvassed all the major issues of Fourth Amendment rights-what is the Amendment's threshold, what is its
central mandate, and what are some of the components of that
mandate?-it remains to consider the question of Fourth
Amendment remedies. Here we can very clearly see two Terrys
at work.
One Terry-the bad one, in my view-affirmed various trite
tropes about the constitutional imperative of exclusion. Thus the
Court told us that:
[Elxperience has taught that [the exclusionary rule] is the
only effective deterrent to police misconduct in the criminal context, and that without it the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures would be
a mere "form of words." The rule also serves another vital
function--"the imperative of judicial integrity." Courts
which sit under our Constitution cannot and will not be
made party to lawless invasions of the constitutional
rights of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental
use of the fruits of such invasions....
When such [unconstitutional] conduct is identified,
it must be condemned by the judiciary and its fruits must
...

70 Id.
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be excluded from evidence in criminal trials.7 '
Elsewhere, I have expressed my constitutional objections to
this way of thinking, and once again, I shall merely summarize
today. The "judicial integrity" argument begs the question and
proves too much. The exclusionary rule has never applied in ordinary civil cases, where the government is free to use reliable
evidence even if such evidence is the fruit of an illegal search.
This long-standing judicial practice does not offend judicial integrity, rightly understood, because courts that adjudicate cases
based on reliable evidence do not thereby become "party" to any
antecedent illegality. They affirm their distinctive judicial integrity as seekers of truth when they permit truthful evidence to
be introduced in their courts. And the same logic applies to
criminal cases-which is why no court in America ever excluded
evidence on Fourth Amendment-like grounds for the first century after Independence. (Of course, the integrity argument is
also disproved by the many exceptions to exclusion in criminal
cases themselves, today-good faith, impeachment, standing,
and so on.)
Connected to the integrity idea is the claim that government
should never profit from its own wrong, and thus must not be
allowed to use any ill-gotten "fruits." Like its integrity sibling,
this argument cannot account for the practice of civil cases,
where exclusion has never applied, or the many exceptions to the
rule in criminal cases. But beyond these lawyerly objections lies
a much deeper moral objection: Wrongdoers are simply not
morally entitled to be restored to the status quo ante which is itself the product of their own wrongdoing. When government
finds stolen goods in an illegal search it does not-and should
not-give the goods back to the thief. The goods should be restored to their rightful owner, not the thief. When government
finds illegal drugs or other contraband, it never gives these back,
nor should it. When, in an improper search, cops stumble onto a
kidnapping in progress, it would be madness for the cops to restore the kidnapping victim to her captors, close their eyes, count
to twenty, and then try again. And the same holds true, legally
and morally, of the use of reliable evidence in the courtroom.
The law is entitled to this evidence secreted away by the wrongdoer, just as the owner is entitled to the restoration of the goods
stolen by the thief, and the kidnapping victim is entitled to the
71

Id. at 12-13, 15 (citations omitted).
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restoration of her liberty wrongly denied by her captors. I stress
this point today precisely because it seems to have escaped some
of my critics. For example, my otherwise thoughtful friend
George Thomas seems to have utterly missed this point-made
repeatedly in my book 7 2 -in his recent defense of the exclusionary rule as restitutionary justice.
Consider next the bad Terry's claim that without the exclusionary rule the Fourth Amendment would be reduced to a mere
"form of words."73 This trope has a nice ring to it, but analytically self-destructs. By referring to "words" the trope unwittingly reminds us that the "words" of the Amendment most emphatically do not require exclusion, and that no one at the
Founding-or for the next hundred years, for that matter-ever
thought they did. Did all these dolts simply not know how to use
words? Were they all simply charmed by the sounds of the syllables, but unconcerned about whether these words were made
real in the world? Of course not. They believed the Amendment
was not a mere form of words, but that the words did matter. It
mattered, for example, that the words do not demand warrants
or probable cause or exclusion. And as for making these words
real in the world, that was the task of civil tort law, not criminal
exclusion law.
And so we come at last to deterrence, the "major thrust" of
the exclusionary rule according to Terry. If it really were true
that exclusion was the only-or even the best-deterrent
scheme, then perhaps some of the bad Terry's other rhetorical
excesses and missteps might be forgiven. But even if we assume
that exclusion deters better than the Founders' scheme, there
would still be huge issues of judicial competence to foist exclusion on the rest of us. A "Leavenworth lottery" in which whenever the government illegally searches person X, judges spin the
lottery wheel and spring some lucky (but unrelated) convict Y
from Leavenworth, might deter like gangbusters, but I doubt
judges have authority to craft a "remedy" with such a loose analytic nexus to the scope of the violation. In any event, I do not
think that "experience has taught" that exclusion is "the only effective deterrent."74 Empirically, the Founding experience and
the experience of other countries, like England and (until re72See, e.g., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 25, at 27, 154-55, 194 n.140.
Terry, 392 U.S at 12 (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961)).
74

Id.
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cently) Canada tend to prove otherwise. In 1961, when Mapp75
was decided, it may have seemed that only exclusion would
work, but Mapp was reacting to a world without a strong civil
remedy system of damages, injunctions, class actions, administrative schemes and the like. At almost the same moment the
Court decided Mapp, it also breathed life back into § 1983,76
which had lain moribund for many decades. Had the Court not
decided Mapp until after a robust § 1983 model had been given a
chance to prove itself, the empirical, analytical, institutional,
and political superiority of that model would have been more
evident. Such a model, as I have explained elsewhere, would
have used all the resources of traditional civil remedies and administrative law-injunctions, class actions, attorneys' fees, punitive damages, entity liability, administrative regimes, and
more-instead of the less traditional and more morally offensive
model of springing the guilty to somehow make the rest of us
more secure.
By 1969, some of the cracks in Mapp's model were beginning
to show, and the good Terry fessed up to some of this:
[Tihe issue [in today's case] is not the abstract propriety
of the police conduct, but the admissibility against petitioner of the evidence uncovered by the search and seizure ....
The exclusionary rule has its limitations, however, as a
tool of judicial control ....
[I]n some contexts the rule is
ineffective as a deterrent ....
Encounters are initiated by
the police for a wide variety of purposes, some of which
are wholly unrelated to a desire to prosecute for
crime ....
Regardless of how effective the rule may be
where obtaining convictions is an important objective of
the police, it is powerless to deter invasions of constitutionally guaranteed rights where the police either have no
interest in prosecuting or are willing to forgo successful
prosecution in the interest of serving some other goal.
Proper adjudication of cases in which the exclusionary
rule is invoked demands a constant awareness of these
limitations. The wholesale harassment by certain elements of the police community, of which minority groups,
particularly Negroes, frequently complain, will not be
71 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
76
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stopped by the exclusion of any evidence from any criminal trial. Yet a rigid and unthinking application of the
exclusionary rule, in futile protest against practices which
it can never be used effectively to control, may exact a
high toll in human injury and frustration of efforts to prevent crime.... [We] in no way discourage the employment of other remedies than the exclusionary rule to curtail abuses for which that sanction may prove
inappropriate.7
This is quite a lot to take in, and here I shall offer only a few
quick points. Note how the above-quoted passage begins to drive
an analytic wedge between right and remedy: The first sentence
sharply distinguishes between the two and later sentences make
clear that the rule simply cannot apply to many Fourth Amendment violations. But if the remedy is not broad enough to deal
with some Fourth Amendment rights, we might begin to wonder
whether it is too broad to deal with other Fourth Amendment
rights. We might begin to wonder, in other words, about the
analytic fit-or lack thereof-between right and alleged
"remedy." And when we look closely, we see that there is no
analytic fit-none whatsoever. The analytic violation is the impermissible search or seizure, not the later use of evidence.
When the cops wrongly search a house and find stolen goods, the
Fourth Amendment wrong is the search-regardless of what it
finds. Returning the stolen goods is not a proper analytic remedy, and the same holds true for exclusion. (A § 1983-based civil
remedy is analytically proper for it is precisely tailored to the
scope of the violation-the unreasonableness of the search itself,
rather than the contingent fact of finding evidence.) And once
we see all this, it would be strange indeed to think that exclusion
would empirically be the best deterrent, since it is not tailoredto
the legal scope of the violation. Its deterrent bite does not turn
on, say, how unreasonable the search really was (the genuine
Fourth Amendment right at stake) but on the happenstances of
whether evidence was found, how much, against whom, and so
on.
Consider, for example, cases where cops wrongly bop citizens
on the nose, or humiliate them without cause. These are unreasonable seizures-and we have seen that the good Terry emphasized important Fourth Amendment values of bodily integrity
7

Terry, 392 U.S. at 12-15 (footnote omitted).
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and individual dignity above and beyond privacy and secrecy
keeping. But whether the cops bopped someone on the nose is
usually wholly unrelated-analytically and even causally-to
whether the cops found any evidence. Exclusion will not work
well in brutality cases, the good Terry confessed. We need to
think about other remedies, the good Terry admitted. But once
we do think about other remedies-like § 1983 suits and the like
for folks like Webster Bivens (a black man unreasonably
searched, and humiliated, in an episode that uncovered no
criminal evidence) 78-- we begin to see how these other remedies
are more precisely tailored to the scope of Fourth Amendment
rights. And we can then ask why such more precise remedies
might not be better than exclusion across the board. In terms of
deterrence we can have more than under the exclusionary rule in
brutality cases. In terms of compensation and restitution, we
can restore to innocent folks like Webster Bivens the respect that
is due them, and some reparations, too. And in terms of distribution, we can avoid giving windfalls to criminals and imposing
taxes on victims of crime, who suffer tremendously when they
see the criminals who preyed on them walk free out of the court
room, grinning, under the exclusionary rule.
To the extent that the good Terry begins to help us see these
things, it of course undermines precisely what the bad Terry said
about the necessity and propriety of the exclusionary rule. And
so upon close examination here we see yet again two Terrys at
work. Three decades after Terry, and two centuries after the
Founding, it is time-no, it is past time-to choose. In light of
what I have said, here and elsewhere, I hope it is clear which
Terry I would choose, and why.

7"See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 389 (1971).
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